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Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002900090134-7
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

USIB-D-5.1/24

16 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT : USIB Security Committee

1. It is timely, in my view, for USIB to revamp its Security Committee, give it expanded authorities and charge it with more responsibility in security policy matters than has been the case in the past.

2. To this end, the present Security Committee has drafted a new DCID 1/11, copy of which is attached for your review. The Committee is to be supported by permanent subcommittees for technical surveillance countermeasures (replacing the present USIB TSCC), for special security compartmentation and for computer security.

3. To implement the provisions of the proposed new DCID 1/11, I consider that:

a. The Committee should be chaired by a senior officer whose background includes experience in substantive intelligence and policy matters rather than solely a security specialist. I would expect the chairman to devote two to three days per week to committee business.

b. The Committee should have a full-time secretary at the GS-15 or GS-16 grade level who possesses a strong background in security matters. I prefer that the secretary be a CIA officer since a major element of his support will be from the CIA Office of Security.

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
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c. The Director, Office of Security, would be the CIA member of the Committee. I would like each USIB principal to provide senior representation on the Committee, preferably at the civilian supergrade or O6 military level.

4. In order to assure continuing policy guidance to the Committee, I believe that active USIB participation is needed, and would expect the Committee chairman to seek such guidance. Close interface between the Committee chairman and the Intelligence Community Staff should enhance the chairman's awareness of policy matters calling for Security Committee attention.

5. I propose that reorganization of the Security Committee be discussed at an executive session of the USIB on 23 May. Each of you is requested to provide me at that time your concurrence and/or comments on the proposed new DCID 1/11, and I invite each of you to nominate a proposed chairman for my consideration.


W. E. Colby
Chairman

Attachment:
Draft DCID 1/11

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9 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for
Management and Services

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : Security Committee and
NIO/USIB Interface

9 Aug 73 Memo

1. Action Requested: It is requested that you generally agree with the basic contents of General Low Allen's memorandum of 7 August 1973 on the interface of the National Intelligence Office with the United States Intelligence Board, particularly in the establishment of a Security Committee headed by a full time Chairman who would serve as a DCI representative.

2. Basic Data: In his memorandum of 7 August 1973, the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community Staff has recommended the establishment of a new Security Committee which would have a representative from each USIB agency and would respond to DCI and USIB on matters of protection of methods, foreign releases, compartmentation, and those matters previously handled by the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee.

By way of background, the existing Security Committee was established in 1959 and is composed of representatives from CIA, State, NSA, DIA, AEC, FBI, USAF, Army, Navy and Treasury. The primary mission of the Security Committee is to promote means by which the intelligence community may prevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. The Committee was established for the purpose of advising and assisting USIB; it provides policy guidance on security matters, as it pertains to the intelligence community; and it makes

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recommendations concerning security standards, practices and procedures. In the recent past the Committee has addressed such issues as DCID 1/14 on "Uniform Personnel Security Standards and Practices Governing Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information";

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[REDACTED]

The problem of the revelation of classified information in the news media was the continuing concern of the Security Committee in recent years.

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[REDACTED]

With respect to "foreign releases", it is presumed that General Allen is referring to the "Release of Intelligence to Foreign Governments" which was studied in great detail by the IC Staff on 4 June 1973 (TAB A). That review focused attention on the need for a reporting system to provide the DCI with a clear indication as to what was being provided particular countries. It stressed that the release of intelligence should be in accord with existing United States policy and there should be a "net advantage" to the U.S. This implies an executive role for a Security Committee in addition to that of providing a record keeping function. As of June 1973, the suggestion was made that the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State should explore with the CIA and other agencies the development of a mechanism by which offices responsible for the release of intelligence could be kept current on changes in U.S. foreign policy and international objectives. Members of the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) and the intelligence community had expressed their concern through the years over this lack of policy guidance on foreign policy matters.

On the "compartmentation" problem, this issue was under intensive recent review by the [REDACTED] and considerable effort has been made to develop a package of simplified policies and procedures. In my memorandum of 18 May 1973, TAB B, I indicated that the existing Security Committee could assume this responsibility.

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Concerning the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, I have also addressed the TSCC in the recent past. My memorandum of 8 June 1973, TAB C, reviewed the attributes of the TSCC from a user's point of view. I noted that the TSCC provided an effective community focal point for audio-countermeasures information, procedures and policy.

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I proposed that reorganization or relocation of the TSCC should permit retention of as many of its significant functions as possible and noted that the bulk of the present TSCC work is carried out by its two "working level groups", the Research and Development Subcommittee and the Audio-Countermeasures Subcommittee. I proposed in June and reiterate now that these two Subcommittees can be effectively merged into one. I concluded with the opinion that the USIB Security Committee could assume the responsibilities of the TSCC. I continue to be of that opinion.

3. Staff Position: The present Security Committee has been traditionally chaired by the CIA Director of Security; meetings are normally held once a month; and a report is submitted annually to the United States Intelligence Board. This Office feels that there would be obvious built-in advantages in having a full time chairman who could address ongoing security problems in the intelligence community, particularly in such areas as leaks to the news media; computer security; compartmentation in the community; release of intelligence and other classified materials to foreign governments; audio-countermeasures information, procedures and policy.

In adopting this positive position concerning a chairman who would have this function as his sole duty, this Office also feels quite strongly that the appointee should have a background of experience and knowledge in the field of security, preferably a member of the intelligence community who has given attention to a wide spectrum of security responsibilities. This Office would obviously expect to establish a close working relationship with the nominee, and it would be expected that the Director of Security would have the prerogative of selecting the CIA representative to the new Security Committee.

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Otherwise, there would be some risk that conflicting security policies might develop from what could be construed as "two Security Offices."

Presumably the Deputy Director for Management and Services is offering overall comments concerning "positions and management." With respect to the new Security Committee, the Office of Security would stress that the designated chairman should have his own support staff and not otherwise be dependent on us for personnel, secretarial assistance, or other resources. This is particularly important at the present time, when we are experiencing such severe cuts in personnel strength and financial resources.

4. Recommendations: In view of the above, it is recommended that:

(a) You concur in the basic concept relating to the establishment of a Security Committee headed by a full time Chairman, serving as a DCI representative.

(b) As a general policy, the responsibilities of the designated Chairman would focus on overall security problems in the intelligence community, which are of direct concern to the DCI and the National Security Council. This Office would retain basic responsibility for personnel, physical, and technical security of CIA.

(c) You make every effort to press for the selection of a well qualified professional Security Officer from the intelligence community.

(d) You strongly urge that the Director of Security be responsible for the selection of an Agency representative to the Committee.

(e) You establish the clear understanding that this Office is not responsible for providing personnel or other resources in direct support of the new Security Committee.

SIGNED

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

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Attachments

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Remarks: Oz: We have just received this memo from Lew Allen with a very close suspense date, COB 9 August. Therefore, we need your input by early afternoon 9 August to be included in the overall response from DD/M&S. In addition to the 7 August Allen paper, we have also attached various background documents that may be of use to you in commenting on the Security Committee concept. While DD/M&S has some overall comments about positions and management, I believe your comments should primarily address the Security Committee idea.					
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Remarks:			
SUBJECT: NIO/USIB Interface.			
Your comments on the attached memorandum to DCI are requested by COB 9 August.			
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Maj Gen Lew Allen, Jr., D/DCI/IC, 			7 Aug 73
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NIO/USIB Interface

1. Your decision to establish NIOs will undoubtedly raise questions in the community concerning interface with USIB. Specifically, there will be a question of the relationship of the NIO concept to the earlier proposal on the USIB committee structure.

2. Basically, the NIO concept subsumes and voids key aspects of the USIB Committee restructure proposal. ICS has completely reviewed the USIB committee proposal and revised the recommendations to accord with the NIO concept. Our review took into account the proposed charges to the NIOs in your memorandum to USIB and the USIB substantive objectives paper (key intelligence questions) which you approved in principle. It was our intent to retain the valuable aspects of community coordination in the current USIB structure while reinforcing USIB's ability to deal with a new emphasis on the prime function of establishing requirements and priorities for its collective production and collection resources.

3. Primary committees. Nine committees should be formed corresponding to the NIOs proposed, with the NIO as chairman. The NIO, plus representatives of the primary producing agencies--CIA, DIA and INR--should form the basic committee membership with additional membership appropriate to subject matter at the option of the NIO. A tenth primary committee should be a Security Committee with a representative from each USIB agency chaired by a DCI representative. (As in the case of NIOs, the chairman should have this function as his sole duty.)

4. These committees would respond to NSCIC and DCI guidance in the production of estimates (NIEs, NIAMs, and NSSM inputs). The NIO would utilize the committee to assign responsibilities to USIB members for inputs and oversee the coordination of products and reports. The committees would also respond to key intelligence questions (KIQs) levied by NSCIC and DCI, evaluating USIB application of production,

processing and collection resources against substantive problems. Overall, however, the most important function of these committees would be to make periodic reports, perhaps quarterly, on the effectiveness and sufficiency of resources applied to intelligence problems in their areas of responsibility. The Security Committee would respond to DCI and USIB on matters of protection of methods, foreign releases, compartmentation, and those matters previously handled by TSCC. }

5. USIB Support Groups. The functions of the current collection system oriented USIB committees (COMIREX, SIGINT Committee, and Human Sources Committee) would be retained. However, the functions of these committees is fundamentally different from those of the primary committees. Under the proposed NIO/USIB committee concept, the functions of the collection system oriented committees would be supportive of the primary committees. The support would be essentially in the area of advice on collection strategies, in consolidation of requirements and priorities by collection system, and on specific security problems. The day-to-day interface with collection system managers (NSA, etc.) would not change appreciably. As a result of these differences, we propose that the current committees be renamed as support groups, i.e., IREX Support Group, SIGINT Support Group and Human Sources Support Group. The latter would subsume the functions of the IPC and the DRC as subelements of the human resources management function.

6. We propose one additional support group to provide foreign scientific and technical support to the primary committees--the Foreign S&T Support Group. This group would subsume the functions of GMAIC, JAEIC and SIC. It would respond primarily to the needs of the Strategic Weapons/SALT NIO, but to the other NIOs as well. (In the case of JAEIC, a minor change to an NSCID would be required.)

7. The USIB Support Groups can be organized in two fundamentally different ways: they can be headed up by "sole-duty" DCI representatives similar to NIOs with staff provided by the USIB members and the O/DCI, or they can be made functions of appropriate Agency offices. In the latter case, COMIREX can be administered and operated by DDI, SIGINT Committee by NSA, Human Sources by DDO, and Foreign Science and Technology by DDS&T or OSI.

8. A choice need not be made soon with regard to COMIREX and the SIGINT Committees. Their names can be changed and their relationships to the primary committees clarified, leaving matters of chairmanship, manning responsibility and reporting chain for future decision. The merging of the various human resource committees into one Support Group with a DDO chairman and the merging of the technical committees under a DDS&T chairman can also be accomplished without further decision at this time.

9. Other Committees. The above actions (or options) can be adopted without specific disposition of other current USIB Committees. If the general concept is adopted, the disposition of other committees can be worked out in detail so as to retain useful features of the current structure. In that light, the following suggestions are less recommendations than observations:

a. Economic Intelligence Committee: The functions of this committee are absorbed in the NIO structure.

b. Watch Committee: The eventual disposition of this committee will be contingent upon the results of ongoing actions to improve warning and crisis reporting systems.

c. NIS Committee: In light of recent disestablishment of the NIS program by USIB, this committee can be terminated.


d. Intelligence Information Handling Committee: The function of this committee requires such close coordination with DCI/IC that its permanent staff could be transferred to ICS. However, USIB member representation should continue.

e. Critical Collection Problems Committee: Since the primary NIO/USIB committees will examine collection problems in their areas of responsibility, there will be no further need for a separate CCPC.

10. If the above expansion on your NIO concept is acceptable to you, I recommend that a follow-up memorandum to USIB be forwarded soon, as it could have considerable impact on responses to your invitation of nominations for NIOs.

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P.S. We have reviewed your comment on an earlier paper on this subject which we rec'd today. I believe this scheme is in consonance with your view. We agree that NIO's should not become in house producers of NIE's etc. see TP 4.


Lew Allen, Jr.
Major General, USAF
Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence
Community Staff

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Remarks:			
<p>Attached is a more fully developed outline of a National Intelligence Office. It is built on Mr. Colby's key concepts -- and designed, as well, to cope with what is sure to be a heavy and challenging work load.</p> <p>MCA - 44B</p>			
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Will be reorganized

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

1. The National Intelligence Office is established as an independent office reporting to the Director of Central Intelligence. It will replace the Office and Board of National Estimates, SAVAN, and possibly other selected units.

2. The National Intelligence Office will be made up as follows:

a. There will be some National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). At least some of these individuals will be on non-permanent assignment; their tours of duty will be staggered, as the Director shall determine, so that each year there will be some turnover. Most of the NIOs will specialize in particular geographical areas or functional subjects of major importance. A few will be generalists, focusing their efforts on projects which cut across various geographic/functional spheres; on special projects laid on by the Director or outside requests accepted by him; on assisting other NIOs in carrying through the time-consuming tasks of

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production and coordination; and on supervising certain office-wide activities (e.g., consultants' meetings [redacted])

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[redacted] The NIOs will be the Director's personal representatives and will report directly to him on their specialized subjects and on all assigned projects. In dealings with USIB member agencies, they will work through normal command channels. They will be responsible for assuring the production of the coordinated products of the Intelligence Community -- NIEs, NIAMs, NSSM responses, DCI briefings (NSC, WASAG, Congress), etc. In the production of coordinated National Intelligence, the NIOs shall use the National Intelligence Office's own substantive/support staff, task the appropriate agencies and elements of the Community for inputs, arrange for panels of experts as may be required, and oversee the process of coordination. The NIOs will assist the Director in identifying customer needs for National Intelligence, uncertainties requiring additional intelligence collection or analysis, and national policy problems on which National Intelligence might offer assistance. They will maintain close contact with the NSC Staff and other principal intelligence consumers and will, as

appropriate, serve as the Director's representatives at NSSM and ad hoc policy support meetings. The NIOs will be charged with presenting for the Director's review, products that are fully objective and take account of alternative views and interpretations that may obtain in different parts of the Community.

b. Each NIO will be provided with necessary secretarial assistance, but only those concerned with the most active portfolios will have staff assistants of their own.

c. The substantive/support staff, serving the office as a whole, will assist the NIOs in developing substantive judgments, in levying requirements, and in drafting, editing, coordination, and producing National Intelligence. This staff, in addition to a substantive complement, will include elements providing central editorial standards and reproduction-and-printing arrangements. To the degree feasible, members of the new staff will be drawn from the present staff of the Office of National Estimates so as to ensure that existing expertise and drafting/estimating skills are not lost. Those members of the new staff who are in the professional grade

levels will be regionally or functionally specialized; each will work primarily under the direction of the NIO in that particular specialty, but will also be available to aid on other projects (e.g., those which cut across a number of geographic/functional spheres). In addition to career ONI staff professionals, the office may utilize professionals seconded on a rotating basis from other components of CIA and other parts of the Intelligence Community.

d. One National Intelligence Officer will be named Director of the National Intelligence Office to exercise administrative authority within the National Intelligence Office and provide direction to the substantive/support staff. He will also chair meetings of National Intelligence Officers for discussion of production planning, work schedules, quality control, and consumer feedback. He will promote cooperative working patterns among the NIOs, encouraging joint projects, constructive criticism of the drafts of others, and cross-fertilization of ideas. A second NIO will be named to act as Director, NIO, in the D/NIO's absence.

3. National Intelligence Officers (tentative):

USSR and Satellites

Europe and NATO

China,

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Southeast Asia

Middle East and South Asia

Latin America and Black Africa

International Trade and Finance

World Energy (especially oil)

• Strategic Weapons and SALT

General Purpose Forces and MBFR

Four or five Generalists, one of whom will serve as D/NIO

(The Generalists will perform the kinds of services indicated in paragraph 2. a. They will, among other things, organize the production of National Intelligence on such topics as East-West and Sino-Soviet relations, subversion and terrorism, radicalism and nationalism, and drug traffic and international crime.)

4. Certain of the tentative positions indicated in paragraph 3 will be identified as open to nomination of candidates by the USIB Members, either from their own agencies or from elsewhere. The remainder will be filled, at least in the first instance, by CIA people. The selections will be made by the Director of Central Intelligence according to his concept of the attributes required and according to individual qualifications. Any individuals selected from outside CIA will serve on reimbursable detail.

5. A Memorandum for USIB will be prepared at a later date, describing the new Office of National Intelligence, explaining its purposes and functions, and calling upon the heads of the various agencies to make nominations to the identified NIO positions.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Members

SUBJECT : National Intelligence Officers

1. National Intelligence Officers will be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence for such geographical areas or functional subjects as may be required from time to time. Each NIO will be the Director's personal representative and will report directly to him on his subject, but all direction will be issued through normal command channels to elements of USIB member agencies.

2. The primary function of an NIO will be to provide contact laterally on his subject across the functionally organized Intelligence Community and with customers and outside consultants as required. Each NIO will be responsible to the Director for providing Intelligence Community coordinated products (using such panels of experts and arranging USIB consideration as may be required) to satisfy requirements for NIE's, NSSM responses, DCI briefings (e.g., NSC, WSAG, Congress), etc. He will assist the Director in identifying customer needs for National Intelligence, uncertainties requiring collection guidance, analysis or production, and national policy problems on which National Intelligence might offer assistance. He will maintain close personal contact with NSC Staff and other principal intelligence consumers and contributors at the departmental level. The NIO will be charged with presenting for the Director's review fully objective presentations of alternate views and interpretations.

3. Each designated NIO will be assigned one or more assistants and secretarial aid as may be required from time to time to assist him in his substantive, coordinating and requirements duties and in drafting or editing when needed. These assistants will be assigned on an ad hoc or extended detail from USIB member agencies as required.

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4. One National Intelligence Officer will be assigned administrative authority for the National Intelligence Officers. He will chair meetings of National Intelligence Officers for discussion of production standards, work schedules, quality control and product review. He will be assisted by an Editorial Staff to provide central editorial standards, schedules and assistance for the National Intelligence Officers.

5. National Intelligence Officers (tentative):

USSR and Satellites

Europe and NATO

Northeast Asia

Southeast Asia

Arab World

Latin America

Economic Intelligence

Strategic Weapons (and SALT)

General Purpose Forces (and MBFR)

6. USIB members are invited to nominate candidates for the tentative positions in paragraph 5, from their agency or from other sources. Final selection will be made by the Director of Central Intelligence according to individual qualifications. Any individuals selected from outside CIA will serve on reimbursable detail.

7. The NIO's will replace the present Board and Office of National Estimates, the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, and other units as appropriate.

W. E. Colby

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2 August 1973

EXTRACT FROM
←

4. Farewell to Treasury Member
of USIB

Speaking for himself and the Board Principals, Mr. Colby thanked Mr. John L. Hart for his contributions as the Treasury Member as well as for his long years of outstanding service to CIA. He wished Mr. Hart well in his future endeavors and also commented that he was looking forward to working with his successor, Mr. William N. Morell, Jr.

Executive Session

The Board was convened in executive session at 1122 hours to discuss the following items:

5. National Intelligence Officers

Mr. Colby distributed to each Board Principal a draft paper which he had prepared on this subject. He then briefed the Board regarding his views of the proposal and how he visualized the duties of the NIOs. Mr. Colby said that he did not wish to put the paper in final form until he had received comments from the Board Principals; he suggested that these comments be available by next week's USIB meeting. He also invited the Board Principals to nominate, in the next two weeks or so, candidates for the tentative list of NIO positions as stated in paragraph 5, noting that final selection would be made by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Following considerable additional discussion the Board:

a. Noted that each USIB Principal who wished to comment on the subject paper should provide his comments to the Executive Secretary by 9 August 1973.

b. Noted that Board Principals are invited to nominate candidates for the tentative NIO positions within the next two weeks or so. (Mr. Colby subsequently decided that the names of the nominees together with resumes of their qualifications should be sent directly to him by 24 August.)

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DD/MGS 73-3185

17 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the IC

SUBJECT : USIB Committee Structure

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 7 Aug 73 to DCI fr D/DCI/IC,
subj: NIO/USIB Interface

1. Although we do not pretend to understand precisely how the complete NIO/USIB concept would work in practice, we do applaud the effort to integrate functions and to encourage better Intelligence Community participation. The attached specific comments about the proposed Security Committee have been prepared by the Director of Security, who is also Chairman, USIB Security Committee. I concur with his recommendations.

2. I am concerned, however, with the management problems implicit in referent memorandum and in the NIO paper discussed at the 12 July 1973 meeting of the Management Committee. While it seems that each NIO (also Chairman of a USIB Committee) must be a substantive expert, he apparently also will be expected to exercise considerable managerial expertise. For example, he must coordinate the efforts of specialists representing IC members, program production requirements, supervise the administrative or clerical inputs, be prepared to brief the Director on short notice and handle many other routine jobs--all without the aid of assistants. In other words, we are proposing that each NIO be given rare and important responsibilities, but seemingly we are not providing him with the wherewithal he needs to do the job. I believe this matter merits additional examination.

3. I would suggest further that a position such as Director of USIB Committees or Coordinator of USIB Committees be created to manage, for the DCI, all NIO/USIB Committee matters. This committee director would have supervisory responsibility over the NIO's and the staff supporting them. Such an arrangement need not prevent direct and frequent contact between the NIO and the Director. It could, however, remove much of the managerial burden from the NIO and enable him to concentrate solely on substantive intelligence matters. Also, I do not consider it practical for the Director to provide direct day-to-day supervision to 10 or more NIO/USIB Chairmen, as stated in the basic NIO paper. Adoption of this suggestion or a similar one would overcome that problem.

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4. The most important function of the Committees is stated to be, reporting on "...effectiveness and sufficiency of resources...". This appears to be at best confusing if not in fact in conflict with the responsibilities of the IRAC. Either the function or the language should be revised.

5. Finally, I am interested in the recommended staffing and associated costs for the NIO/USIB Committees and Staff and the impact on the Agency. I will anticipate early discussion of this matter with you and other officials.

6. Assuming that reasonable solutions to the management problems are forthcoming, I endorse the NIO/USIB concept described in referent memorandum.

/s/ Harold L. Brownman

HAROLD L. BROWNMAN
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services

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DD/M&S 73-3155: Memo dtd 7 Aug 73 to DCI fr D/DCI/IC, subj: NIO/USIB Interface

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